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IS A WIDENING GENDER WAGE GAP NECESSARILY CAUSED BY A GLASS 
CEILING? A CASE STUDY FROM UGANDA 
 
 
Abstract 
Contrary to what is generally assumed, the gender wage gap and the glass ceiling may not 
necessarily be positively related. An exploratory analysis of aggregate public service 
personnel data for Uganda shows that the gender wage gap is small at the middle level of 
management, whereas it is twice as high at the top. At the same time, the share of women in 
top positions appears to be twice as high as at the middle ranks. Hence, it seems that in the 
context of a very patriarchal culture, women “have to pay” for being promoted to the top 
rather than that there is a linearly thickening glass ceiling that would drive a widening gender 
wage gap. The exploratory data analysis suggests that the glass ceiling effect may have an 
equally vicious partner in the shape of a glass ceiling trade-off. 
 
 
Keywords: glass ceiling, gender wage gap, public service, Uganda 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The literature on occupational segmentation, the glass ceiling, and gender wage gaps assumes 
a close and positive relationship between these three phenomena of gender inequality in the 
labour market, across the globe (Anker, 1998; Wirth, 2001). Linda Wirth (2001), for example, 
argues in her insightful cross-country overview of the glass ceiling that the glass gets thicker 
to the top and that women’s disadvantage in wages is a major implication of this vertical 
segmentation. This view is also known as the glass ceiling effect on the gender wage gap at 
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the top of the wage distribution. In recent literature, this effect is assumed to be so strong that 
the two terms become conflated, so that the metaphor of the glass ceiling is also used to refer 
to gender wage differences. For example, Hiau Joo Kee (2006) reports a glass ceiling effect in 
Australia: “A striking result is the sharp acceleration of the gender gap as we move towards 
the upper tail of the conditional wage distribution. This finding suggests that there is a glass 
ceiling in the private sector (Hiau Joo Kee, 2006: 420 & 423)”. He adds that, controlling for 
demographic and education variables, the gender wage gap rises to the top of the wage 
distribution, concluding that “the glass ceiling is due to differences in returns between 
genders (idem, p. 423)”. In this last quote, the term glass ceiling does no longer refer to the 
limited share of women in top positions but to the limited opportunity for women to increase 
their wages in a similar way as men do at the top. Another example of applying the glass 
ceiling metaphor to the gender wage gap, can be found in Albrecht et al. (2003). They 
emphasize that “we do not view occupational, or more generally job, segregation as an 
explanation of the glass ceiling effect. Occupation and wage are jointly determined variables. 
In this sense, occupational segregation is the form in which the glass ceiling is manifested 
rather than an independent explanation of it” (Albrecht at al., 2003: 163). Following these 
authors, Arulamparam et al. (2006: 164) interpret in their analysis of the gender wage gap in 
Europe “a widening gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution as a glass ceiling.”  
The argument for treating the two phenomena of glass ceiling and gender wage gap at 
the top of the wage distribution as in a causal relationship, or even as synonymous, is that 
constraints to women’s career development hurts their prospect for wage increases. This 
argument is convincing at the individual level. But such a micro-relationship does not 
necessarily imply that the two phenomena are also positively related at the organisational 
level. Using aggregate public sector personnel data, I will explore to what extent this holds for 
the public service of a developing country in a specific context of, on the one hand, a 
patriarchal culture and, on the other hand, a gender-aware policy environment. The case study 
of Uganda is exploratory due to a lack of sufficiently detailed data such as information on 
jobs and performance. It portrays a specific historical and cultural context from which no 
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generalizations can be made. The data are from the year 2004, and the Uganda-specific 
literature used in the analysis concerns the period around this year, namely 2002-2007. 
Taking this context into account, the case study provides an insight into correlations between 
the glass ceiling and the gender wage gap at the organisational level in the public sector. The 
case study serves to explore whether the gender wage gap at the top should, as the literature 
indicates, be attributed to the glass ceiling, or whether there may also be another mechanism 
behind large gender differences in pay at the top. 
 
 
Gender Inequality in the Public Service of Uganda 
 
Summary of the data 
The sample of 2004 aggregate personnel data of the central public service at the management 
level contains all employees at the four top positions with a BA or MA degree, employed by 
ten out of the twenty three central ministries of Uganda, excluding incomplete cases. No data 
was available for decentralized public services. The selection of ministries is based on the 
availability of gender disaggregated personnel data for all four function levels. There are no 
indications of any substantial differences between the ministries that are included and those 
that are excluded from the sample with respect to gender distributions over function levels or 
specific gender policies. The data covers a total of 739 cases and were obtained from the 
personnel statistics of the government of Uganda through a former MA student who wrote a 
dissertation in 2005 supervised by the author, and the data are not publicly available
1
. The  
variables in the dataset concern gender disaggregated data on number of employees per 
function level (4 levels), level of education (2 levels), age, years in the public service, years at 
current position, and monthly salary (in Ugandan Shillings, excluding benefits). The number 
of women is 188 and men 551, which implies an overall female share of 25 percent of 
management positions in the public service. All employees work fulltime. The summary 
statistics in table 1 show that men and women have rather similar proportions of educational 
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degrees, with no statistically significant gender difference. Female employees are on average 
three years younger than their male counterparts, a difference which is statistically significant 
(p<0.01) and have on average one year less employment in the public service, which is, 
however, not statistically significant.  
 
------------------------------------ Table 1 somewhere here ------------------------  
 
Gender wage gap 
The gender wage gap in the public service dataset is 5.3% on mean wages, well in line with 
the public sector gender wage gap in other countries, and the difference is statistically 
significant (p<0.05). The distribution is quite dispersed as the high standard deviations show, 
but not extremely skewed, with a 6.4% gap on median wages. The public sector gender wage 
gap in Uganda is much smaller than for the economy as a whole (Sebaggala, 2007; Kagundu 
and Pavlova, 2007). Table 2 provides summary data for the gender wage gaps in the public 
sector data per function level. At the junior level, the female/male wage ratio is 0.94, at the 
senior and manager levels the ratios are 0.98 and 0.96, respectively. At the director level, 
however, the gender wage gap is largest, with a ratio of female to male wages of 0.93. 
 
------------------------------------ Table 2 somewhere here ---------------------- 
  
Glass Ceiling 
Diagram 1 provides a picture of the number of men and women employed at each of the three 
top function levels, as well as for the entry level for comparison. The gender differences in 
employment are statistically significant at all function levels (p< 0.05). 
 
---------------------------------------- Diagram 1 somewhere here ----------------------- 
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The diagram shows the percentage of female and male employees per function level. It 
reveals, contrary to what is assumed in the literature, that the glass ceiling does not get thicker 
to the top but is thickest at the middle management level. At this middle level, the average 
share of women is 20% as compared to 30% at the entry level and the top, suggesting that it is 
particularly difficult for women to get promoted to senior and manager functions, where men 
still hold a comfortable majority. Table 3 provides an overview of the share of women and 
men with an MA degree at each function level. Although overall the share of men with an 
MA degree is three percent higher than that of women, the difference is smaller or even 
reversed at the middle management level. For senior officers, the male advantage is reduced 
to one percent, whereas for managers, the share of men with MA degrees is three percent 
lower than for women. Combining these results with those of diagram 1, it appears that at the 
middle management level where the glass ceiling is strongest, women’s educational 
attainment is, on average, higher than that of men, not lower
2
. 
 
---------------------------------- Table 3 somewhere here -------------------------- 
 
 
Glass Ceiling Versus Gender Wage Gap 
 
Combining the measures of the gender wage gap and the glass ceiling, the data of the public 
service in Uganda seems to suggest a trade-off between promotion and pay. At the senior and 
management levels, the wage gap is small, whereas at the director level, the wage gap is twice 
as high. At the same time, the share of women is lowest at the senior and management levels 
while it is quite high at the director level, similar to that at the entry level. 
 In order to find out whether the gender wage gap should be attributed to differences 
in human capital between men and women or to other factors, a wage equation is estimated. 
The regressions are run with the ordinary least squares method and use natural logarithms for 
the wage variable and a dummy for the education variable. The equation below estimates 
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women’s and men’s wages separately, with limited control variables, since, as explained 
above, the dataset is rather aggregate and does not include data on performance or job 
characteristics.  
 
lnWj
i
 = C + αEDUCj
i
 + βAGEj
i
 + γLENGTHj
i
  
 
W = wage, C = constant, EDUC is an education dummy (BA = 0, MA =1), AGE is the age 
variable, and LENGTH refers to the length of service; i = f, m to indicate female or male 
variables, and j = all, d: either all function levels (all) or only the director level (d). 
 Table 4 provides a summary of the regression results. The first two rows show the 
results for all function levels. For these regressions, both the female and the male estimations 
have a moderate to low fit, suggesting that unmeasured variables play a substantial role in the 
wage determination, and more so for men than for women. The parameter for education is 
statistically significant and almost the same for women and men, indicating that there are 
similar returns for men and women from MA degree. The correlations for age and length of 
service are quite weak, while for men, the age variable is not statistically significant. 
 The last two rows show the regression results for the director level only – the top 
function level where the gender wage gap is biggest. For female wages, the coefficients for 
education and age are negative, weak and not statistically significant. Only length of service 
is positive and statistically significant. For male wages, age is also negative, small and not 
statistically significant. For males, education is positive, as expected, and the parameter size is 
relatively large, and statistically significant. Apparently, for men, having an MA degree 
matters for promotion to the director level, whereas for women it does not seem to have a 
significant impact. This is interesting in the light of the earlier established result that women 
have relatively more often an MA degree at the level immediately preceding the top: being 
higher educated, hence, does not seem to help women to get promoted to the top. Length of 
service is for men and women alike positive but weak and statistically significant. Overall, the 
wage regressions suggest, first, that length of service is the most important variable 
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explaining women’s and men’s wages in the public sector, and second, that having an MA 
degree is a more important determinant for male  wages than for female wages. 
 
-------------------------------- Table 4 somewhere here -------------------------- 
 
In order to have an idea of gender inequality in wage setting in the public sector, the gender 
wage gap will be further explored
3
. A basic form of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder wage 
decomposition was used, because of the restriction of the dataset to a small number of 
variables. The results of the exploratory wage decomposition are shown in table 5. The table 
shows that at the top level, where the gender wage gap is biggest, 80% of the gender wage 
gap cannot be explained by the human capital variables in the dataset, against only 25% for 
all four function levels. This result is in line with Albrecht at al. (2003) for Sweden, Kee 
(2006) for Australia, and Arulampalam et al. (2006) for Europe. But the glass ceiling figures 
at the four function levels point out that this effect of a widening unexplained wage gap to the 
top cannot be attributed to a glass ceiling effect, because at the director level, the glass ceiling 
is thinner than at the lower function levels.  
 
------------------------------------- Table 5 somewhere here ------------------------- 
 
The exploratory data analysis indicates that next to a glass ceiling effect, there may be another 
mechanism leading to a high gender wage gap at the top, which similarly to a glass ceiling 
cannot be attributed to differences in human capital variables between men and women but to 
differences in rewards to these variables. This suggest a “glass ceiling trade-off” hypothesis, 
implying that women “have to pay” for being promoted to the top, whereas remaining at the 
middle management level does not trigger such a penalty in their wages compared to men. 
This hypothesis needs further analysis which requires more detailed data at the organizational 
level in the public and private sector of developed and developing countries, and with rich 
qualitative data on possible causal mechanisms of such a trade-off. 
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 The last section will briefly review possible reasons for a “glass ceiling trade-off” 
hypothesis, both from the literature and from Ugandan public service review reports. 
 
 
Wage penalty for women at the top? 
 
Glass ceiling at the middle ranks 
For the glass ceiling, the literature on gender and leadership points out that in competitive 
environments where the share of women is very low, women are less successful in competing 
for scarce resources, such as jobs, compared to men (Ridgeway, 2001). The male-dominated 
competitive context of management positions in the Ugandan public service has been 
characterized in a review as likely to be affected by a strong patriarchal culture, in which men 
are regarded as natural leaders. This may discourage women to compete for promotion to the 
middle ranks. The report mentions “… the possibility that the persistence of patriarchal 
attitudes that view men as natural leaders may preclude women from seeking positions of 
leadership…” (HRI, 2002: 1). 
However, for the director level, where the share of women is higher, the competitive 
environment may have partly different determinants, due to a top-down gender 
mainstreaming policy of the Ugandan government (Government of Uganda, 1997). This 
policy, implemented in 1997 by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, has 
led, among others, to the appointment of several female commissioners, which are positions 
at the director level. These are political appointments, motivated by the Cabinet’s dedication 
to a visible implementation of its gender policy – for a mix of motivations, including access to 
donor funds from development cooperation. Hence, the presence of women at the top level 
may be a result of a visible expression of gender mainstreaming policy in the public service 
through political appointments of women at the top. A recent UN report on the public service 
in Uganda indicates that there is some resentment among male employees about this visible 
gender mainstreaming policy and its implementation. The report states that “in the public 
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sector 48% of informants reported that gender influences recruitment in their organizations” 
(UN, 2004: 13). Some employees have the feeling that women are advantaged over men in 
promotions: “62% of the respondents reported that there is no difference between women and 
men of the same qualifications when it comes to promotions, whereas 23% claim that women 
are more likely to be promoted than men.” (idem: 14) The authors of the report attribute this 
belief to the recent gender mainstreaming policy. Interestingly, the report adds, “it has to be 
pointed out that the fact that the large majority of those interviewed were male may have 
influenced perceptions towards a larger proportion considering that women have an advantage 
both in recruitment and promotion.” (p. 14)  
 
Wage penalty at the top 
The literature on the gender wage gap and payment structures indicates that some payment 
systems are more likely to perpetuate gender wage gaps than other systems. Rubery et al. 
(1997) have argued that a seniority payment system tends to behave as an alternative to 
promotion. The Ugandan wage regressions reported in table 4 showed that both for men and 
for women, seniority is a statistically significant variable for the organisation as a whole 
although not as strong as education. This suggests that in the Ugandan public service the 
payment system is for an important part based on education and seniority rather than on 
performance, a feature that has been confirmed in the earlier mentioned civil service survey 
(UN 2004: 12). This would help to explain why at the middle ranks, the gender wage gap is 
small: women generally do not get promoted to the director level but get stuck at the middle 
level (if they reach that level at all) at which they receive wages very close to those of their 
male colleagues, having similar levels of seniority qua age and length of service. 
Women are much less equally rewarded at the top. The belief among public servants 
that women are either treated equally or even advantaged over men, as the above quoted UN 
report states, may lead to women directors being less liked than male directors. A US 
experimental study on gender and leadership has pointed out that when male and female 
managers were ranked by subjects according to their likeability, that equally competent 
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women were less liked when they worked in what were regarded as male occupations. This 
lower ranking also resulted in lower salary rewards (Heilman et al., 2004). For the Ugandan 
case, this may suggest that women in top leadership positions may trigger resentment among 
male managers at the top, leading to a penalty for their promotion in their payment. Such a 
wage penalty is possible because wage setting is generally less influenced by the political top 
than appointments, and therefore the determination of wages of directors is more in the hands 
of line managers and HRM departments. Moreover, the political top is not likely to be very 
concerned with the wages of female directors, because wages are generally not made public, 
and hence, are not a visible dimension of the implementation of gender equality policies. In 
contrast to equal wages. female director appointments are more in the interest of political 
leaders who have committed themselves publicly to national or international gender equality 
objectives. Finally, the female directors themselves may also not know that they earn less 
than their male counterparts – or they feel that they have to accept it as part of the deal, as a 
trade-off. 
 
In conclusion, there seems to be some support in the literature for a glass ceiling trade-off 
hypothesis next to the generally assumed glass ceiling effect on women’s wages. Such a 
trade-off seems to operate even in the presence of a strong political commitment to gender 
mainstreaming, because such a top-down approach does not seem to be able to affect gender 
biases in organizational culture, in particular on those affecting the less visible forms of 
gender inequality such as the gender wage gap. The follow-up of the 1997 gender policy in 
2007 (valid for the period 2007-2017) is a continuation of the same approach, and therefore is 
not likely to affect the perverse relationship between women’s careers and earnings in the 
public sector
4
. 
In order to be able to better document possible male resistance at the middle 
management level against the promotion of women, and male resistance at the top level to 
proportionate wages for women in leadership positions, two types of data are necessary for 
further analysis. First, more detailed personnel data so that more sophisticated wage 
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regressions can be run, with more control variables, in particular on performance. Second, 
complementary qualitative data, through interviews and/or focus groups discussions, which 
should focus on the attitudes of HRM managers, line managers, and colleagues towards the 
promotion and equal pay of women at the top. This would help to reveal motivations and 
actions of male managers against promotion of women in the public service and against equal 
pay when women do reach the top. Only with more detailed data, adequate measures may be 
designed to prevent that women face a glass ceiling at middle management levels and that 
they literally have to pay when they are, eventually, promoted to the top. 
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Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of management positions in the public service of Uganda, 
2004 (n = 739). 
 Education (%) Age 
(years) 
Length 
of 
service 
(years) 
Number of 
employees 
(%) 
Mean 
wage 
(Ugandan 
Shilling) 
(Stdev) 
Median 
wage 
(Ugandan 
Shilling) 
 
 BA MA      
Women 139 (74) 49 (26) 39 13 188 (25) 657,957 
(284,337) 
611,950 
Men 390 (71) 161 (29) 42 14 551 (75) 694,296 
(297,018) 
653,730 
Total 529 (72) 210 (28) 41 13 739 (100) 685,051 
(294,079) 
650,098 
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Table 2. Wages and gender wage gaps (n = 739) 
 Mean female 
wage (stdev) 
Mean male 
wage (stdev) 
Female/male 
wage ratio 
Junior officer 450,532 
(94,036) 
477,035 
(90,701) 
0.94 
Senior officer 651,086 
(139,181) 
661,863 
(157,275) 
0.98 
Manager 792,942 
(123,127) 
824,537 
(238,705) 
0.96 
Director 1,041,701 
(353,223) 
1,125,200 
(392,020) 
0.93 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1. The glass ceiling in the Ugandan public service (n = 739) 
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Table 3. Educational distribution per function level (n = 739) 
 Women with 
an MA degree 
(%) 
Men with an 
MA degree  
(%) 
Junior officer 11 13 
Senior officer 28 29 
Manager 47 44 
Director 41 47 
All levels 26 29 
 
 
 
Table 4. Gender wage regressions for the Ugandan public service (n = 739) 
Dependent 
variable 
Education Age Length 
of 
service 
Constant R
2
 
logWall
f 
(n = 188) 
0.132** 
(2.283) 
0.014 *** 
(2.612) 
0.013*** 
(2.738) 
12.582*** 
(79.699) 
0.365*** 
logWall
m
 
(n = 551) 
0.153*** 
(4.096) 
0.003 
(0.820) 
0.019*** 
(5.843) 
12.939*** 
(110.913) 
0.235*** 
logWd
f
  
(n= 34) 
-0.059 
(-0.349) 
-0.009 
(-0.450) 
0.044*** 
(3.079) 
13.237*** 
(17.028) 
0.370*** 
logWd
m
 
(n= 76) 
0.246* 
(1.844) 
-0.015 
(-0.943) 
0.040*** 
(3.644) 
13.532*** 
(20.549) 
0.224*** 
Note: t-statistics in brackets; level of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, and * = 0.1. 
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Table 5 Gender Wage Gap Decomposition for the Ugandan Public Service 
Function level Gender wage 
gap (%) 
Explained 
proportion 
Unexplained 
proportion 
Director 7.4 0.20 0.80 
All 5.3 0.75 0.25 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 The following ministries are included in the sample: Agriculture, Defence, Education, Energy, 
Finance, Gender Labour Development, Internal Affairs, Local Government, Public Service, and 
Tourism.  Six outliers for the wage variable have been removed from the dataset, because the wages for 
these cases were at least double the wage of the highest wage for the remaining 739 cases. 
2
 The weighted average share of women with an MA degree at senior and manager level is 35.6% 
whereas for males at these two middle management ranks it is 34.8%. 
3
 The standard decomposition method was used, filling in the female averages of all variables into the 
male wage equation. 
4
 In the foreword to the 2007 gender policy (Government of Uganda, 2007), the Minister writes: “The 
challenge ahead of us, therefore, is to ensure that we build on the best practices and measures 
articulated in this policy so as to achieve gender equality for women and men in Uganda. As we move 
forward, we now need to keep the gender mainstreaming process on track in order to accelerate the 
pace towards achieving our gender equality targets.” The report, however, does include a monitoring 
and evaluation indicator that is helpful: the proportion of women in decision-making positions by 
sector and level. 
